InfoSec

  • When Cryptography Depends on Noise, Not Data: The Hidden Risk in Quantum-Safe Systems

    When Cryptography Depends on Noise, Not Data: The Hidden Risk in Quantum-Safe Systems

    Quantum-safe cryptography is often promoted as the long-term shield against quantum attacks, but a critical blind spot is rarely discussed: some of these schemes fundamentally rely on noise and noise is a physical phenomenon, not a mathematical one.Once your security depends on unpredictable errors, anyone who can control those errors can start bending the…

  • Zombie Processes: Dead Code That Still Haunts the System

    Zombie Processes: Dead Code That Still Haunts the System

    In operating systems, not every threat is loud. Some are silent, subtle, and buried deep in the process table. Zombie processes fall exactly into that category: tasks that have already finished execution but refuse to disappear. They’re technically dead, yet still present a residue of poor process management that can grow into a system-wide…

  • Backdoors at the BIOS Level: When the Infection Lives Below the Operating System

    Backdoors at the BIOS Level: When the Infection Lives Below the Operating System

    Cyber-attacks usually fight in the world you can see files, processes, drivers. But the most dangerous threats don’t play in that arena. They go underneath everything, burying themselves in the firmware that initializes the machine long before any OS boots. These are BIOS/UEFI-level backdoors, and once they get a foothold, they operate with a…

  • Mental Jailbreak: When the System Trusts the User Too Much

    Mental Jailbreak: When the System Trusts the User Too Much

    Modern mobile operating systems are designed around one fundamental assumption: the user is both the owner and the greatest threat to the device. This paradox is at the core of every security model in Android and iOS. While vendors invest heavily in sandboxing, mandatory access control, and kernel hardening, a single decision made by…

  • Cache Side-Channel Attacks: When Time Itself Becomes a Leak

    Cache Side-Channel Attacks: When Time Itself Becomes a Leak

    Modern computing systems rely on multilayered memory hierarchies designed for speed, not secrecy. CPU caches — L1, L2, L3 — exist to accelerate access to frequently used data. But that optimization introduces a blind spot: timing differences. Attackers can observe tiny delays in memory access and extract information that should never be accessible. No…